On 11-12 May 2023, the Prague Process Secretariat took part in the European Migration Network (EMN) Conference, hosted by the Swedish EU Presidency. The following key takeaways shall inform the Prague Process states and future actions in this field.
The disasters recently witnessed in Pakistan, France or Germany are a stark reminder of the estimated 3,5 Billion people living in areas severely affected by climate change and environmental degradation and disasters. Their impact on migration is here to stay, often involving socioeconomic struggle and armed conflicts.
The EU is already supporting the regions most affected in adapting to the new realities. With 30% of its Official Development Assistance (ODA) supporting climate action, it is a global leader in addressing climate change. Along with climate and disaster induced displacement, the important role of legal migration also requires particular attention and action.
The Swedish Minister for Migration called for an EU adaption strategy to boost resilience and take the lead against climate change. Future droughts and agricultural detriment will worsen the political and socioeconomic conditions around the globe, potentially resulting in substantial displacement. According to World Bank estimates, 215 Million people could be internally displaced by 2050. Nonetheless, the stark lack of funding and mitigation investment persists. Climate change, peace, migration, development and humanitarian action need to be tackled together, thus requiring much more and stronger international cooperation.
Extreme weather events have doubled over the past 20 years. As large groups have been forced to move, the awareness on environmental displacement has increased. Immediate disasters are often interlinked with gradual climate change, making it difficult to isolate climate factors from other push factors. As there is no single solution, a combination of different policies and levels is needed. Whereas preventive measures are required in order for affected populations not to leave their homes, receiving countries also need to discuss how to go about future climate induced immigration.
Climate change constitutes a global phenomenon with local implications. In Europe, temperatures have risen at double speed. Whereas the displacement provoked by ever more frequent natural disasters is most obvious, the interrelation between climate change and mobility is not always clear-cut. Evidence shows that most displacement can be reversed. Moreover, the number of victims of natural disasters has decreased significantly, even though much bigger populations have been affected. This is mostly contributed to better prediction and the resulting timely evacuation of those at risk. Moreover, construction has considerably improved, making buildings more resilient. Most recent disasters were weather related, rather than of geophysical nature (e.g. earthquakes, volcanoes). Out of the 342 million people displaced in the period 2008-2021, 90% escaped weather related events, such as floods or storms. International border crossings remain rare and mostly occur when disasters are close to a border or take place in conflict areas where no support is available. Importantly, out of the 342 million displaced, only six million (2%) did not return home[1], mostly into dysfunctional states (e.g. Afghanistan, Somalia). Meanwhile, gradual changes such as the degradation of the subsistence base are not always linked to climate change but perceived as economic struggle.
The growth of the global urban population by 2,4 billion people as compared to only 300 million people in the rural population (in spite of higher birth rates) indicates that many more people now live in cities, which tend to be three to four degrees hotter. As people mostly move to camps or informal settlements in cities, there are certain trade-offs between short-term uncoordinated measures and long-term solutions to address structural issues. Instead of accepting how rural populations turn into poor working class when moving to cities, their skills should be used to feed these growing cities.
There also is a high range of uncertainty concerning the scope of future sea-level increase, meaning that policy makers need to decide how much to invest in which scenario. Of the 327 million people living less than five meters above sea level, 62 million live in high-income countries and another 115 million in higher middle-income countries. However, at present, water deficits result in five times more migration than water excess. Amidst droughts, it is mostly the low-skilled who are forced to move but not everyone has the option to do so.
Notwithstanding that climate change does not automatically lead to loss of life and displacement, better preventive measures, preparation for humanitarian intervention and disaster relief are urgently required. Adaptation and mitigation measures need to be prioritised, including through capital market instruments and more creativity in making use of them. Cutting emissions is of course essential as is the integration of climate migration into development planning. Policy makers need to take measures for the period before, during and after the migration has occurred.
Exposure, vulnerability, age, work sector, and time constitute key elements within the climate migration nexus. Mobility is one strategy to cope but most people would prefer staying close to home. While no one should be left behind, people on the move need much stronger agency. Permanent resettlement most often results in a changing subsistence base. Community based relocation requires a lot of work, wide-ranging agreement and the respective legal frameworks. Mobility can thus be managed if all relevant stakeholders work together. The necessary climate resilient development thus requires a whole-of-government approach, rather than stricter border controls. Otherwise, mobility could become overly expensive, ODA could be wasted, and many ongoing measures may turn out meaningless.
As humanity increasingly starts to experience the impacts of climate change, more foresight on future developments is needed. This requires more and better data for scenario development. There is a need to invest in understanding the drivers of climate migration through evidence based research, models and consultations. Moreover, little is known about what happens to those displaced. While there often is global data available, only granular data can show the local and regional impacts. But even the available data and findings rarely lead to concrete actions. Whereas policy makers try to avoid sudden changes, they need to urgently overcome policy entrenchment through decisive action.
The answer to the question which specific circumstances drive displacement is a complex one. People are mostly forced to move when exposed to natural hazard and are too vulnerable to deal with it. However, this exposure and lack of resilience are human factors, rather than natural ones. Whereas environmental, political, demographic, and socioeconomic factors all play a role, they also indicate the multiple entry points for various policy responses. These include the reduction of hazards through mitigation; reduced exposure through migration or relocation; and reduced vulnerability through adaptation and risk reduction. People usually leave when their livelihoods can no longer be sustained. The typical scenarios of displacement range from sudden onset to slow-onset ones, from multi-hazard (e.g. sea-level rise, combined with floods) to disaster and conflict. They are not always easy to distinguish. For instance, islands become inhabitable long before they sink in the sea. Cross-border movements often result from a lack of alternatives and protection at home. Those leaving mostly seek refuge with their relatives and friends abroad.
In view of demography and aging in developed countries and high birth rate in numerous developing countries, labour migration will also be an ever more important policy instrument in tackling climate and disaster induced mobility and displacement. Whereas 140 million people enter the global labour markets every year, only 40 million can actually be absorbed. In this respect, the country of birth remains the biggest determinant of economic success. Climate challenge will further exacerbate global imbalances, and labour mobility can play an important role in mitigating these developments. People losing their jobs and livelihoods will still have to sustain their families. Circular mobility can be one solution in this respect. As most job losses will occur in the agricultural sector, more seasonal workers will become available. Their mobility should be enhanced to use their skills more effectively than in urban areas. For instance, the droughts in Mexico have increased seasonable migration to the agricultural sector of the USA. The EU should also expand the geographic scope of the Talent Partnerships. Its legislation on seasonal workers or the single permit will play a key role. Labour, student and circular migration may overall have far more leverage than the limited humanitarian pathways available. At the same time, skills and mobility partnerships need to avoid brain drain, particularly in the context of green transition.
Possible policy responses to disaster displacement and climate mobility further include the establishing of areas of free movement, the introduction of humanitarian visa and temporary protection, or immigration quotas for people from affected countries. As cross-border movement is often justified, the related policy responses need to emerge at regional level. As per their Action Plan 2023-2027, the Prague Process states shall jointly assess future actions in this direction.
Further reading: Groundswell Report (World Bank) and EMN Inform (2023).
[1] According to information of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre.
