



## POLICY BRIEF

# Forced Migration from Ukraine: migration scenarios 2.0

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### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Twenty months after the onset of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, a military stalemate has emerged. This current situation suggests that neither Russia will be able to capture further Ukrainian territory, nor will Ukraine be able to reclaim large parts of the occupied regions in the near future. However, as witnessed in the spring and autumn of 2022, when the Ukrainian armed forces drove back Russian invaders, surprises cannot be ruled out.

As of January 2024, 6.5 million Ukrainians seek shelter abroad, with 4.2 million in the EU (possibly fewer) and around 5 million remaining internally displaced, totalling 10.5 million. Within Ukraine, 17.6 million people require humanitarian assistance, even though the economy is slowly recovering. The overall situation for Ukrainians, both within and outside the country, is characterised by a protracted war and great uncertainty regarding the war's outcome, their legal status in host countries and integration prospects.

Various surveys indicate that less than half of the displaced Ukrainians in Europe are considering staying in the host countries in the foreseeable future, whereas another third contemplates a return. The remaining fifth, the trend decreasing, is still undecided. However, migration intentions are notoriously dynamic and predictions are unreliable. Nevertheless, it is clear that a large proportion – up to 2.3 million who could be joined by 460,000 family members bringing the total to 2.76 million – is unlikely to aspire to return any time soon.

This policy brief considers the displacement and forced migration inside and outside Ukraine's international border, the dynamics of these movements, the individuals' aspirations and the possible future developments in migration trends while reassessing scenarios developed in 2022.



## BACKGROUND

Two years ago, President Putin ordered the [Russian Federation to invade Ukraine](#) (ISW), deploying an army of around 160,000 soldiers. Reports of September 2023 claim that Russia deploys around [420,000 soldiers in Ukraine](#) (Bloomberg). The total Russian army, estimated at [1.2 million](#) (Forces.Net), compensated for the losses by mobilising an additional [335,000 recruits](#) (Reuters). In contrast, the Ukrainian armed forces could have been expanded from pre-war levels of 300,000 to around [one million](#) (The Time). By 2023, there could be up to 700,000 soldiers on the battlefield on both sides, over [400,000 Russians](#) including mercenaries and [200,000-300,000 Ukrainians](#). The continuous severe fighting has resulted in losses on both sides, reaching levels not seen since World War II potentially totalling up to [500,000 military personnel](#) dead or wounded (New York Times), with Russian casualties possibly outnumbering Ukrainian ones at a ratio of 4:1.

At the start of the invasion, large parts of northern, eastern, central, and southern Ukraine, including the capital Kyiv, came under attack. Up to 12 million people, comprising Ukrainians and also a few hundred thousand immigrants, almost a third of the population in government-controlled territory, fled from the fighting or the threat of occupation. Coordinated evacuations facilitated many of these movements. By April 2022, the Ukrainian armed forces managed to halt and partially push back the invaders from Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Chernihiv, Sumy, and Mykolaiv. In September 2022, they successfully liberated additional territory in the South and East of Ukraine, in Kherson and Kharkiv. Despite fierce [Russian offensives](#) (ISW) and [Ukrainian counteroffensives](#) (Financial Times), the military situation seems to have reached [a stalemate](#) (The Economist) by summer 2023. As of November 2023, Russia continued to [occupy around 18%](#) of Ukraine's territory (CfR), including Crimea, most of Luhansk, large parts of Donetsk, and sections of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson.

By September 2023, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) recorded [27,149 civilian casualties](#) in Ukraine, with 9,614 killed and 17,535 injured. Moreover, according to the Ministry for Reintegration of Ukraine, [11,000 people are missing](#). However, these numbers are deemed "likely higher" (OHCHR), especially considering the potential 87,000 to 100,000 casualties during the siege of Mariupol ([Euromaidan Press](#)). There has been a noticeable increase in [civilian attacks](#) using long-range missiles since the summer of 2022 (CSIS) and a surge in Russia's [missile barrages](#) and drone attacks (UN) since the summer of 2023, contributing to an unstable security situation across much of Ukraine.

Due to the war, thirteen cities with a total pre-war population of over one million (e.g. Mariupol, Lysychansk, Sievierodonetsk, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Rubizhne and Izyum; author's calculation) as well as many villages have been almost completely destroyed. In total, [1.5 million homes](#) (UNDP) were destroyed and millions of Ukrainians lost the roof over their head and most of their possessions.

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Figure 1: Some key data on the war (all by mid, end 2023)



The economy experienced a significant setback with a 29.1% drop [in 2022](#) (IMF), but it has recovered to +2% in 2023, partly due to the substantial funds flowing in from Ukraine's donors. By May 2022, the war had led to the loss of 4.8 million ([ILO](#)) to 6.4 million ([ZOiS](#)) jobs, but around [a third of these jobs could have been recovered](#) by summer 2023. While some [normalcy](#) (The Conversation) has returned to many parts of Ukraine, 17.6 million Ukrainians within the country [require humanitarian assistance](#) (UNHCR). Donors provided [\\$350 billion to Ukraine](#), de facto subsidising the state, economy and society (Conflict Tracker). Additional expected costs of the post-war reconstruction are estimated at [\\$411 billion](#) (World Bank).

## Stock of Ukrainians in diverse host countries

By November 2023, [4.2 million Ukrainians](#) (increasing) (EUAA) were still registered under the Temporary Protection Directive in the EU, initially marking a 10% decrease from [4.6 million](#) (EUAA) recorded in October 2022. In autumn 2023, forced migration largely came to a halt, with the level of women remaining stable or temporarily shrinking, while the number of men significantly increased by [300,360](#) (Eurostat) from September 2022 to September 2023. Presumably, many of these men, who are not permitted to leave the country under martial law, exited Ukraine irregularly, averaging 823 persons per day; however, because entry to the EU is visa-free, this does not affect their subsequent regular stay in the Union.

Another [1.27 million are claimed to be in Russia](#) (UNHCR), but these numbers are likely false. Instead, there are probably [fewer than 1 million](#) and decreasing, due to onward migration (Kuzemska). Ukrainians also move to the US ([271,000 as of February 2023](#)), the UK ([174,000](#)), Canada ([199,000](#)), Türkiye (around [50,000](#)), and Georgia ([26,000](#)). However, some of these figures are contested. For example, in Germany, a discrepancy is noted between registered Ukrainians and Ukrainians present, suggesting there could be [250,000 fewer of them](#) (Düvell), a situation that may be mirrored in other countries.


By May 2023, an estimated 4.8 million Ukrainians had returned to their home, the majority of whom were returning internally displaced persons, and one million Ukrainians returning from abroad, mostly from Poland (412,000) and Germany (96,000) ([IOM](#)). It seems plausible to suggest that returning Ukrainians often do not revoke their Temporary Protection status, leading to an assumption that there are fewer than 4.2 million Ukrainian displaced persons in the EU, possibly around 3.9 million or less. Besides, around one million Ukrainians hold a Canada-Ukraine Authorization for Emergency Travel ([CUAET](#)) permit but have not (yet) moved to Canada (Government of Canada). Since arriving in Russia, Türkiye and Georgia, many Ukrainians have either returned or moved on to other destinations, explaining the significant decrease in numbers in these countries.

Another [3.7 million](#) registered persons (IOM), [4.8 million](#), according to the Ukrainian government or even an estimated [5.1 million](#) (IOM) are internally displaced. In addition, anecdotal evidence suggests that there is an issue with men living unregistered in other parts of the country in order to avoid conscription into the army. **Hence, between 9.31 million and 11.28 million Ukrainians are still displaced internally or internationally.** A notable proportion, up to 29%, is less likely to be in need of international protection and therefore represents "[quasi-labour migrants](#)", the Centre for Economic Strategy suggests. The [high level of border crossings](#) between Ukraine and the EU, averaging 1.1 million in either direction monthly since May 2022 (Centre for Economic Strategy), illustrates high levels of mobility and suggests significant [transnational activities](#) (DIW).

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**Table 1: Stock of Ukrainian displaced persons (summer 2023)**

	Ukrainians in the EU	Ukrainians in Russia	Ukrainians in the US, UK, Canada, UK, Türkiye and Georgia	IDPs	Total
Min	3.9 mio.	< 1 mio.	710,000	3.7 mio.	9.31 mio.
Max	4.2 mio.	1.27 mio.	710,000	5.1 mio.	11.28 mio.



In addition, Ukrainians are residing in the EU and other countries on other types of largely “pre-war” permits or coming as visitors under the 90-day visa-free agreement and not intending to seek temporary protection but to return soon. On 31 December 2022, [Eurostat](#) recorded 1.41 million valid permits of Ukrainians in the EU (for employment, studies, family reasons and others but excluding temporary protection and asylum; the figure excludes Greece and Denmark for which no data was provided). Another 355,000 immigrants were in the [USA](#) before the war, 13,400 permanent permits were issued to Ukrainians in [Canada](#) five years before the war, and 30,000 were recorded in [Türkiye](#). These must be added to the number of Ukrainians in the EU and other countries but are not considered in this paper, which focuses on forced migration alone.

## **Legal framework and reception conditions**

The legal framework for temporary protection in the EU, which expires in March 2025 and cannot be extended according to the current law, leaves an uncertain [legal perspective for Ukrainians](#) (ICMPD) in the EU. Among other host destinations, [Canada](#) is presently an exception, offering a pathway to permanent residence, whereas [Poland](#) offers temporary residence. [Labour market integration](#) (OECD) is uneven across OECD and EU countries; however, it goes faster compared to other national groups. The [EUAA survey](#) of September 2023 suggested that 58% of Ukrainians are employed across the EU. In Poland, for example, [65%](#) of Ukrainian refugees of war have already been employed (Notes from Poland), and [56%](#) found a job within the first three months (EWL). In the Netherlands, around [50%](#) or 34,000 worked. At the same time, only 19% or [140,000 worked](#) in Germany in April 2023 (BfA). Meanwhile, about 19% of the employed may continue working remotely for Ukrainian employers ([EUAA](#)).

### ***Situation is characterised by uncertainty.***

*The current situation for Ukrainians is characterised by significant uncertainty due to the military stalemate, volatile security situation in Ukraine, the limited duration of the temporary protection status and uneven labour integration progress across the various countries hosting Ukrainians.*

## **Scenarios of the war**

The [Prague Process Policy Brief of June 2022](#) outlined six scenarios depicting the possible outcome of the war, ranging from the complete withdrawal of Russia to the complete defeat of Ukraine, and the resulting migration dynamics. Since then, very little has changed on the battlefield, in diplomatic efforts or in terms of migration movements. What has changed, however, is the outlook of the war.

The war is already [taking longer](#) (Defence News) than initially projected by Russia or expected by various commentators. It has taken the form of a [war of attrition](#) (CSIS) and is likely to last well into 2024 or even 2025. Notably, the military situation in spring 2023 largely mirrored the current status quo, with the same territories affected by fighting or occupation. **It is fair to conclude that the [most likely scenario](#) of the war’s further development is the continuation of the current combat situation and the partial Russian occupation of Ukraine in the foreseeable future.** Presently, there are no signs of the Russian army faltering or withdrawing or the [Kremlin leadership changing its ambitions](#), nor is there evidence of the Ukrainian defence weakening, and much less proof that additional Ukrainian territory comes under Russian control. However, akin to the events in winter 2022, Russia [intensified its rocket assault](#) against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure in winter 2023/2024, though with less effect. The move is less aimed at weakening the military but rather at undermining

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the resilience of the Ukrainian people. Meanwhile, international funds continue to be made available, though at a [decreasing level](#), to bolster the resilience of the Ukrainian people and country, and keep the Ukrainian economy afloat.

## Migration prospects

In June 2022, the most likely scenario was that “2.9 million [Ukrainians] could stay in the EU, 20% would aspire family reunification and thus could be joined by 580,000 family members. Therefore, a total of [3.48 million Ukrainians could settle in the EU longer term](#)” (Prague Process). Methodologically, this assumption was based on a few surveys and extrapolation of forced migration patterns observed during the period 2014–2021 in Ukraine.

Since then, several surveys and qualitative studies have been conducted across the EU, in various countries hosting Ukrainians, in Ukraine itself, as well as in different time periods to study the future migration of Ukrainians. A caveat remains, however: the methodologies and the survey questions diverge, making comparison of outcomes difficult if not impossible. In the following, the main survey results shall be considered, and some key differences and themes highlighted.

## Drivers of migration

Based on the diverse survey results that address potential drivers of migration, **the reasoning to stay home or leave Ukraine strongly rests on security considerations, which is typical for refugees**. Thus, the survey of the [Agency for Legislative Initiatives](#) found that “79% of forced migrants indicated at least one security reason for leaving”. The joint [EU-AA-OECD survey](#) captured that a “reason to flee Ukraine was to escape possible (but not yet materialised) military actions (53 %) or because of actual military attacks (49 %), followed ... by the deprivation of basic needs (food, water, housing) (33 %), the fear of unemployment and poverty (20 %)”. According to the Gallup survey conducted in July and August 2023, “a record-high 53% of Ukrainians said there were times in the past year when they could not afford food they or their families needed, while nearly half (48%) said they struggled to afford adequate shelter”. Another survey by [NDI](#) in January 2023 showed that, nevertheless, 89% of respondents were optimistic about Ukraine's future, however, according to the [Rating Lab](#), 40% believed that achieving victory would take more than a year.

The five surveys conducted by [Cedoss](#) between March 2022 and September 2023 also reflected that within Ukraine safety and uncertainty are key concerns followed by employment and financial situation. Separation from relatives and related negative repercussions are another worry. Air raids, shelling and power outages led to delays in work and undermined planning and organising work. Grief over the loss of their previous lifestyle and uncertainty is common. Chronic stress, fatigue and psychological problems are an increasing concern. On the other hand, a new type of solidarity and pride is emerging as is the desire for change.

When survey results are analysed against **the drivers compelling return home or stay in the host country, the reasoning rather rests on the utility of the host country with regards to the quality of life and overall well-being, and thus rather resembles the reasoning of economic migrants**.

The overwhelming majority, 87%, perceive opportunities in Europe better than in Ukraine; notably, 87% believe income is higher in the host countries ([Centre for Economic Strategy](#)). However, among Ukrainian refugees in Poland, Romania and Moldova, 68% of respondents to the [NRC](#) survey of January 2023 say that the income and support they are receiving are not enough to cover their basic needs, putting them “at risk of falling into poverty”. According

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
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to the Centre for Economic Strategy, 67% are satisfied with conditions in the host country, with [Rating Lab](#) survey capturing an even higher figure of 85%. However, dissatisfaction arises from issues such as bureaucracy, lack of e-governance, education, medical services, affordable housing and restrictions to self-employment and business opportunities, with younger people being even more critical than older people. Three-quarters of Ukrainians also believe that language is a barrier to employment, and more than one-quarter believe that there is only access to low-skilled jobs. The [Rating Lab](#), at the same time, concludes that “the longer Ukrainians stay abroad, the better they evaluate the country of stay”.

The elderly, those separated from family still in Ukraine, or those facing inclusion challenges in host countries are more likely to want to return ([UNHCR](#), [IOM](#)). Also of the refugees in Poland, Romania and Moldova, 44% of respondents left family members behind, which may serve as a driver of return migration, as well as family reunification aspirations ([NRC](#)). For 58% of returnees, financial assistance “is the most critical need” ([IOM](#)). According to the [Agency for Legislative Initiatives](#), “the most important reason that reduces the desire to return is the expectation of a low quality of life in Ukraine”.

Not covered in the surveys are men escaping Ukraine to avoid mobilisation/conscription into the army and, related to this, the aspiration to reunite with family already abroad under temporary protection. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that returnees, notably men, may face resentment from those who did not leave, although [surveys](#) indicate that so far only 6% report discrimination.

Graphic 1: Drivers of migration compared



Source: [Agency for Legislative Initiatives](#)

## Migration aspirations

Examining various survey results with a focus on migration aspirations expressed by respondents **allows to make a careful observation about a shift of aspirations in favour of staying in host countries**. However, no clear trend can be depicted given that questions about return aspiration range from return in general terms, return within three months,

return within one year to return after the war or return following a temporary stay after the end of the war.

In September 2022, only 9% of Ukrainians still had the aspiration to migrate from Ukraine, a decrease from 35% recorded before the war according to [Gallup](#) or from 26% according to [Delmi](#). This drop can be attributed in part to the fact that a large part of the population with pre-war migration aspirations has left the country.

One of the earliest multi-country surveys ([FRA](#)) found that in autumn 2022 the proportion of those who would like to return to Ukraine (35%) was similar to the proportion of those who would like to stay in their host country (38%), while almost one in four respondents were undecided and about 4% planned to move elsewhere. Of the refugees surveyed by [UNHCR](#) six months after displacement, 13% wanted to return home within three months, 44% had no such plans and 43% were undecided, which shows a greater level of uncertainty and undecidedness at the beginning of the war. Meanwhile, [UNHCR's survey](#) of spring 2023 showed that 14% aspired to return within three months and 62% in the future, only 6% had no return aspirations and 18% were undecided. Notably, 68% did not aspire to return in any near future.

The [Centre for Economic Strategy](#) (CES) survey of November 2022 suggests that 63% eventually planned to return to Ukraine, 14% did not, and 23% were undecided. However, 40.9% have changed their plans since late 2022 and 32% were less inclined to return than anticipated previously. Accordingly, the CES concludes that between 1.3 million and 3.3 million are staying abroad, respectively 2.1-3 million could be returning (June 2023), while those who are staying could be joined after the war and the end of martial law by 100,000 to 745,000 relatives. The elderly, 65+, and those with lower education are most likely to return ([Centre for Economic Strategy](#)). The results of the July 2023 survey by the [Agency for Legislative Initiatives](#) equally highlight higher return likelihood among the elderly compared to youth, while concluding that over “two-thirds of forced migrants are unlikely to return to Ukraine before the end of the war; two-thirds of forced migrants plan to return to Ukraine after the end of the war”.

Of those surveyed within Ukraine in early 2023 by the [Ukrainian Institute of the Future](#), 37% noted that they have close relatives who left the country, 36% believe that their relatives will definitely return to the country (they have firmly decided on this), 32% - that their relatives may return if it is safe and there is work in Ukraine, 14% - that their relatives are unlikely to return, because they are already settling in a new place. Only 5% believe that their relatives will definitely not return and 10% could not answer this question.

With regards to actual visits to Ukraine, the [EUAA-OECD joint surveys](#) (2022) revealed that only 12% of respondents visited the country once, 5% visited occasionally and 1% came regularly. 50% planned to visit Ukraine, with the West, Kyiv and North being the most likely destinations, and the East being the least likely. Yet, 34% expressed their reluctance to ever return. Put bluntly, a significant proportion, presumably from the East and possibly those displaced twice, lost faith in Ukraine. By June 2023, 46% of Ukrainians had visited Ukraine ([Rating Lab survey](#)), whereas 60% did not, and this share is even higher among Ukrainians from the East or women with children. 49% of Ukrainian refugees would not like to stay living abroad but 33% aspire to stay abroad permanently.

Looking at the return aspirations of IDPs, the [IOM survey \(June 2023\)](#) suggests that 1.06 million IDPs, roughly a fifth of all IDPs, consider returning. Decision-making on relocation or re-displacement is largely related to economic factors, public participation, and access to adequate housing in areas of return. 95% of returnees do not consider re-displacement, hence return appears sustainable.

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If only Poland and Germany are considered, hosting most displaced Ukrainians under temporary protection in the EU, more respondents are favouring stay over return in 2023 compared to 2022. In Germany, the share of responses has increased by 2–3% when it comes to those aspiring for permanent stay (29 % in 2023 vs 27% in 2022) or temporary stay (15% vs 12%). Conversely, the share decreased among respondents aspiring to return after the end of the war, from 33% to 31%, and among undecided from 26% to 21%, with only 2% wanting to return within one year. Women, refugees with partners in Ukraine and those from Kyiv and the North exhibit higher aspiration to return. Those without children, possessing stronger language proficiency, employed or in education are less likely to want to return. In other words, the better Ukrainians are integrated, the less likely they are to return. A considerable 30% aspire to maintain close contact with Germany and to temporarily live there (DIW). In Poland, fewer but still “almost half of the refugees intend to stay for at least a year after the war has ended”, while in March 2022 such a desire was prevalent among 31% of war refugees. 31% aspire to return as soon as possible, 22% one year after the war ends, 17% aspire to stay for several years and 6% permanently, whereas 16% were undecided (EWL).

**Table 2: Overview of survey results (2022 and 2023)**

Survey agency	Time	Sample size	Coverage	Stay	Return	Undecided	Further details
FRA	8-9/2022	14,685	Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Czechia, Germany, Italy, Spain, Estonia	38%	35%	23%	23% want to commute regularly
UNHCR	8-9/2022	4,800	43 countries	44% no plans to return	13% within 3 month; 81% hope to return one day	43%	
UNHCR	12/2022-1/2023	3200	EU		77-79%	18%	
EUAA	2/2022 – 1/2023	5317	EU	34%	./.	./.	
UIF	3/2023	1200	Globally	19%	68%	10%	Survey of relatives in Ukraine
CES	11/2022, 4/2023	1003, 404	EU	63% (11/2022)	32% (4/2023)	23% (11/2022)	Aspiration to stay increasing
UNHCR	4-5/2023	3850	Europe, incl. Russia, Turkey and Georgia	68%	76%	18%	Due to awkward question stay and return intentions overlap
Rating Lab	6/2023	2116	EU	33%	49%	./.	
ALI	7/2023	1032	EU	./.	2/3	./.	After end of war
IAB-BiB/ FReDA-BAMF-SOEP	8-10/2022, N=11,225, 1-3/2023	6754	Germany	44%	33%	21%	30% aspire transnational ties
EWL	2/2023	400	Poland	45%	31%	16%	

Although, as was noted above, no clear trend can be drawn, three surveys conducted in 2022 suggest high return aspirations of up to 68%-80%, whereas five surveys conducted from April to July 2023, one year since the onset of the war, suggest increasing aspirations of staying in the host countries of 31% to 49%. In the meantime, the proportion of the undecided seems to fluctuate around 16% to 23%.

### ***Scenarios of future migration***

By conflating the above survey results with the number of Ukrainians in the EU, amounting to 3.9 million assumed to 4.2 million registered, between 1.3 million and 1.89 million Ukrainians aspire to stay in the EU as of summer 2023. On the other hand, between 1.2 million and 2.058 million aspire to return, whereas between 624,000 and 966,000 remain undecided. If the undecided Ukrainians follow the overall trend, another 206,000 to 435,000 of them could stay. Therefore, **the estimated number of Ukrainians staying in the EU ranges between 1.5 million and 2.3 million.**


Furthermore, this number needs to reflect potential family reunification. As one of the [German surveys](#) implies, of **46.5%** women, 36% have partners abroad and 46% of them could aspire to get their partners to the EU. The family reunification-driven migration by male Ukrainians would be negligible not exceeding 13,300 persons. The number of Ukrainians residing in the EU who still have children in Ukraine (9% of women) and who consider having these children join them is small too (max. 25,000). Overall, another 335,000 (low estimate) to 366,000 (high estimate) Ukrainians would enter the EU after the end of the war and the martial law. To this, family reunification of other relatives (e.g. parents) needs to be added, though there are no sufficient survey data on this type of family reunification aspirations. The limitation of this calculation is that it is based on a German survey extrapolated to the entire EU. Therefore, one also needs to consider that in countries bordering Ukraine, such as Poland, where commuting is an alternative to relocation, the wish to reunite families might be less widespread, hence, actual family reunification might be lower than this extrapolation implies.

Overall, if both Ukrainians with an aspiration to stay and those who could come through family reunification are considered, the total number of Ukrainians in the EU due to the war could go up to anywhere between 1.82 million and 2.67 million with a medium figure of 2,25 million<sup>1</sup>. An unknown factor is the future (irregular) migration of men, on average 23,100 per month since September 2022. If arrivals remain at this level, this will increase the estimated total up to 10% per year.

However, the survey results suggest that significantly fewer displaced Ukrainians are likely to stay in the EU as was assumed in the [w](#) when scenarios were based on assumptions, non-representative or preliminary surveys and scenarios.

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<sup>1</sup> This figure does not consider the number of Ukrainians staying on another type of permit.



**Table 3: Migration scenarios (as of autumn 2023)**

Stock	Staying Min/max	Returning Min/max	Undecided (subsequently staying)	Subsequently staying	Family reunification*	Total	Mean
3.9 mio.	1.3 mio.	1.2 mio.	624,000 (207,000)	1.5 mio.	330,500 (incl. 9,500 women and 17,000 children)	1.83 mio.	2.25 mio.
	1.8 mio.	1.9 mio.	819,000 (270,000)	2.07 mio.			
4.2 mio.	1.4 mio.	1.3 mio.	672,000 (221,000)	1.62 mio.			
	1.89 mio.	2.058 mio.	966,000 (staying 435,000)	2.3 mio.	366,000 men (incl. 13,600 women and 25,000 children)	2.66 mio.	

\* Formulas: stock: 46% (women): 17% (who aspire family reunification) = total of post-war Ukrainians through family reunification. 19.9 % (men), 6% have partners in Ukraine, of these 61% aspire family reunification (all only according to a German study, hence, here, total results are extrapolated to entire EU)

Importantly, those staying in the EU are more likely to be younger, without children, better educated, employed, and more likely from eastern Ukraine. **Both in demographic as well as in economic terms the loss for Ukraine but also the gain for the host countries would be significant.**

Having said this, one needs to bear in mind that any significant detrimental change in the security and policy situation in Ukraine, any major advances of Russia or any policy changes that reflect the goals of Russia will likely result in another major outflow of Ukrainians to the EU, possibly another several million people, [4.8 million or even more](#).

## Conclusion

With regards to future migration between Ukraine and the EU or other host countries, the Ukrainian government has an [interest and promotes the return of its citizens](#) (Ministry for Reintegration) as soon as the security situation allows. The State Migration Service of Ukraine even “requests that Ukrainian citizens not be classified as refugees and that [programs for their integration in the host country not be established](#)” to almost compel return. However, it seems, “Ukraine did not formulate a policy for the return of forced migrants” ([Agency for Legislative Initiatives](#)), and the Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine only occasionally refers to the return of internationally displaced citizens. On the other hand, several host countries, which have by now invested significantly in the integration of Ukrainians to compensate for own labour force shortages, may well have an interest in retaining a certain proportion of these Ukrainians. Meanwhile, Ukrainians have human agency and make their own choices based on the security and economic conditions in Ukraine, in the host country, their family situation and a range of other factors. As a result, a potential conflict of interest may arise between these three actors with regard to migrating, staying, returning or moving to a third country. Conversely, as is widespread in international migration, beyond the options of ‘being either here or there’, there are the in-between [transnational](#) strategies of a life partly spent in Ukraine and partly in the host country. Addressing the matter will require certain diplomatic efforts and partnership approaches.

Political reasoning (safety) and economic reasoning (overall well-being) in migration decision-making appear to increasingly overlap as a result of dire economic and social condi-

Any significant detrimental change in the security and policy situation in Ukraine, any major advances of Russia or any policy changes that reflect the goals of Russia will likely result in another major outflow of Ukrainians to the EU, possibly another several million people, [4.8 million or even more](#).

tions within Ukraine and, so far, comparably stable legal and comfortable social conditions in the various host countries. **This suggests that future migration will not only be shaped by the outcome of the war and the security situation, but also by Ukraine's economic prospects, as well as the outcome of integration and overall well-being in host countries.**

It remains decisive how and to what extent the allies of Ukraine continue supporting the country to defend itself. In case of deteriorating conditions in Ukraine, Europe might well be confronted with another several million Ukrainian refugees.

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