



POLICY BRIEF

Changing Demographics in the Countries of the Prague Process: Implications for Migration

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By the 2020s, many countries are projected to decline in population, with some 90 countries in the world losing population to 2100, primarily in Europe, East Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean, with 23 countries expected to more than halve their populations.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Policy Brief will focus on one of the widely recognized global processes: the decline of human populations. Rapid population growth accompanied development during the second half of the previous century. Demographic decline or the potential for decline will underlie development over the first half of the present century. This Policy Brief will draw attention to some of the inherent tensions created by this process and specifically its linkages with migration, both internal and international. It will flag up the overall demographic trends across the Prague Process countries, identify differences across the countries, and highlight policy issues that will need to be addressed.

TOWARDS A CONTRACTING WORLD

The world in the second half of the twentieth century was characterized by rapid population growth. The spirit of the age was well captured in the book, *Population Bomb*, in which the fear of overpopulation and of demographic growth out of control were going to lead to the collapse of societies.¹ These fears were shown to be exaggerated, largely because overall growth has declined since then.

Demographically, we are moving into a very different world, which will be reflected in shifts not just in economic and political development but also in global patterns of migration. By the 2020s, many countries are projected to decline in population, with some 90 countries in the world losing population to 2100, primarily in Europe, East Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean, with 23 countries expected to more than halve their populations.² Only populations in the Arab world and in sub-Saharan Africa are expected to continue to grow, even though at reduced rates.



The countries of the Prague Process (hereafter PP) will not be immune from this process and many are, in fact, well down the road to population decline (Table 1). Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, Serbia and Ukraine have already entered either into a phase of very slow or negative population growth. Yet, not all follow precisely the same pathway, with some commencing the transition earlier than others. Azerbaijan and the Central Asian countries are not expected to embark upon any demographic decline until mid-century or beyond.

Table 1. Non-EU countries of Prague Process: Total Population, 1990-2100 (in thousands)

	1990	2000	2020	2030	2050	2100
Armenia	3,538	3,070	2,963	2,967	2,816	2,039
Azerbaijan	7,243	8,123	10,139	10,740	11,065	9,162
Georgia	5,410	4,362	3,989	3,853	3,517	2,514
Albania	3,286	3,129	2,878	2,787	2,424	1,088
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4,463	3,751	3,281	3,127	2,685	1,641
Montenegro	615	614	628	624	589	454
North Macedonia	1,996	2,035	2,083	2,051	1,857	1,249
Serbia	9,518	9,488	8,737	8,250	7,084	4,217
[Kosovo			1,884	1,932	1,859	
Kazakhstan	16,384	14,923	18,777	20,639	24,024	27,918
Kyrgyzstan	4,373	4,921	6,524	7,446	9,126	10,985
Tajikistan	5,284	6,216	9,538	11,557	16,308	25,328
Turkmenistan	3,684	4,516	6,031	6,782	7,949	8,421
Uzbekistan	20,398	24,770	33,469	37,418	42,942	42,271
Belarus	10,151	9,872	9,449	9,265	8,634	7,430
Republic of Moldova	4,366	4,203	4,034	3,886	3,360	2,012
Russia	147,532	146,405	145,934	143,348	135,824	126,143
Ukraine	51,463	48,838	43,734	40,882	35,219	24,413
Turkey	53,922	63,240	84,339	89,158	97,140	86,170

Source: United Nations World Populations Prospects, Volume II, New York, Kosovo Census 2011

Once fertility decline has become sustained and on pathways towards below replacement-level, no significant reversal is generally observed, even with policy interventions that are designed to reverse the trend.

Fertility decline

Population decline is driven primarily by a reduction in fertility, the onset of which has been variable across the PP countries. A key indicator is the time a country reaches a total fertility rate (TFR) of around 2.2, when the population is just replacing itself (Table 2). However, populations do not suddenly go into decline. It takes several decades for lower fertility to lead directly to total population decline, which occurs when the number of women in the reproductive cohorts, 15 to 45 years old, begins to decrease. Fluctuations may indeed occur, and the rate of decline can vary depending upon a number of factors often revolving around economic or political crises. It is worth emphasizing, however, that once fertility decline has become sustained and on pathways towards below replacement-level, no significant reversal is generally observed, even with policy interventions that are designed to reverse the trend.

**Table 2. Non-EU countries of Prague Process:
Total Fertility Rates, 1985/1990-2095/2100 (children per woman)**

	1985-1990	1995-2000	2015-2020	2025-2030	2045-2050	2095-2100
Armenia	2.60	1.75	1.76	1.76	1.77	1.78
Azerbaijan	3.20	2.25	2.08	1.92	1.77	1.74
Georgia	2.26	1.72	2.06	1.98	1/88	1.80
Albania	3.15	2.38	1.62	1.49	1.51	1.69
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.86	1.68	1.27	1.21	1.42	1.68
Montenegro	2.11	1.91	1.75	1.74	1.73	1.75
North Macedonia	2.27	1.83	1.50	1.47	1.56	1.70
Serbia	2.23	1.83	1.46	1.42	1.54	1.71
[Kosovo						
Kazakhstan	3.03	2.00	2.76	2.50	2.16	1.84
Kyrgyzstan	4.06	2.96	3.00	2.70	2.32	1.88
Tajikistan	5.50	4.29	3.61	3.22	2.68	1.95
Turkmenistan	4.55	3.03	2.79	2.49	2.12	1.80
Uzbekistan	4.40	3.10	2.43	2.21	1.94	1.77
Belarus	2.08	1.31	1.71	1.75	1.79	1.81
Republic of Moldova	2.64	1.70	1.26	1.36	1.50	1.64
Russia	2.12	1.25	1.82	1.83	1.83	1.84
Ukraine	1.95	1.24	1.44	1.47	1.60	1.70
Turkey	3.39	2.65	2.08	1.92	1.76	1.73

Source: United Nations World Populations Prospects, Volume II, New York


Countries have embarked upon the process of fertility decline at different times and experience that decline at different rates. In some countries, such as France, which pioneered the decline in Europe from the end of the eighteenth century, the decline fluctuated considerably with periods of increase, whilst in others, such as Germany, the decline was much sharper and definitive from the beginning of the twentieth century. Generally, the countries of Europe had reached low levels of fertility (but above replacement level) at 2.67 children per woman by 1950, although that aggregate number hides a considerable variation in levels. The total fertility rate of the United Kingdom in 1950, for example, was 2.18 compared with 3.63 in Poland and 3.43 in neighbouring Ireland.³

Despite a rise in fertility in Europe during the late 1950s, and into the 1960s, by 1980 all the countries of the present EU showed fertility levels well below replacement level with an aggregate figure of 1.87. The decline continued to reach a low of 1.43 in the early years of the twenty-first century, after which a small increase took place to reach 1.5-1.6 by the 2010s. No increase to levels even approaching that of replacement are anticipated for the rest of this century with countries in the east, south and centre of the EU experiencing marked population decline to 2010 (see Map 1). Only countries in the west and northwest are projected to experience population growth, mainly driven through migration, although post-Brexit, the situation for the UK may change.

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Map 1. Projected population change in European countries, 2015 to 2100



Within the non-EU countries of the Prague Process, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus fertility had either declined to reach replacement-level or were very close to that level by 1970; Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, North Macedonia, as well as Georgia, reached this level by 1990, with Albania, Armenia and the Republic of Moldova following some ten years later. Azerbaijan did not reach replacement level fertility until after 2000, with Turkey reaching this level in 2010. Kazakhstan did reach below replacement-levels of fertility around the turn of the century but then exceptionally saw an increase in fertility after 2005 and is not expected to see a further dip to lower fertility until the 2030s. Uzbekistan should reach replacement-level by 2030, with Turkmenistan expected to follow some 20 years later, although Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are not estimated to reach this level until after mid-century (Table 2).

Population decline and migration

Over the medium to longer term, populations are set to decline **and migration becomes an increasingly significant component of population change**. Nevertheless, as modelling under various scenarios has shown, immigration cannot replace cohorts lost to fertility decline.⁴ The numbers required to maintain a national population at current levels of total population, labour force or balances between current labour force to total population, would be far in excess of what would be politically acceptable, quite excluding the issue that sourcing, managing and integration of such numbers over a long period would simply not be viable.

Migration can exacerbate or mitigate population growth or decline depending upon circumstances. Excluding those countries that still maintain relatively high levels of fertility, only those countries such as Australia, Canada and the United States, which operate large and comprehensive immigration programmes, will see their populations continue to increase at a steady if low rate throughout the current century.

Population decline and migration in the EU and the UK

In the EU, although more deaths than births have been registered since 2012, a small increase in total population between 1999 and 2020 occurred due to an annual net immigration of 0.9 million.⁵ The EU-wide figure hides considerable variation among its constituent countries. Population decline is to be found along its southern and eastern fringes while north-western and central regions show increases. These differences reflect relative differences in fertility, with the lowest rates observed in Italy, Spain, Greece, Finland and Portugal, but also net centripetal movements of populations towards the economic heartlands.

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Germany, which has been a major country of immigration since the 1960s and accommodated some 1 million asylum seekers and refugees in 2015, will still see a slight decline in its total population of half a million from 2020 to 2030 from 83.7 to 83.2 million. However, a much sharper decline of 8 per cent in its labour force (25 to 64 years) will occur over the same period.⁶ Despite the importance of immigration over several decades, from a policy point of view Germany only recently accepted that it had become a country of immigration, even though it had opened its borders wider than most to cater for the ethnic Germans after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. While it also accepted waves of refugees from the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the Middle East in the 2010s, the immigration has only slowed its overall trend to population decline.

The **United Kingdom** had been a country of immigration during the post-WWII period and consistently showed one of the fastest population growth rates in northern and western Europe over recent decades. Given that much of that growth originated in migration from the EU when the UK was a member, it seems unlikely that the growth will continue beyond the termination of free movement from EU countries from the end of 2020.

The admission of large numbers of immigrants each year, often in the face of considerable public resistance to such programmes, is but part of the reason that overall growth of population continues. The fertility of immigrant populations is higher than that of the native-born, even if that fertility trends towards the norm over time, and intermarriage among immigrants and between migrants and native-born increases. Over one quarter of the number of births in the United Kingdom, one of the principal destinations in Europe, is to a foreign-born mother, for example. Hence, **migration becomes significant** not just for supporting a market for goods and services and for the supply of essential skills, but also **for the reproduction of the very population** itself in countries where fertility has already declined.

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Population decline and migration in Prague Process countries beyond the EU

The countries in the PP outside the EU are themselves at different stages of the demographic transition, although they will face similar challenges. While the majority will see their populations and labour forces decline well before mid-century, with the exception of Russia, few are major destinations for migration. Certainly, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus experienced significant interchanges of population after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, a process that had repercussions across most of the countries of the PP, although, in the three countries named, the foreign-born as a proportion of the total resident population range from 8 through 11 per cent. Nevertheless, these flows are female dominant, with median ages in the late 40s and early 50s.

This gender and age composition of the foreign-born is typical of the immigrant populations of the PP countries as a whole brought about through the creation of new states in the 1980s and 1990s. These flows in terms of age and gender profiles are quite different from those skilled, labour and immigrant flows to the EU noted above or to those immigrant flows to other major global non-PP countries. The flows of migrants to most PP countries have slowed in the twenty-first century or remained stable. The one exception is to mineral-rich Kazakhstan where migrant workers continue to be attracted to a booming, oil-rich economy but also to Turkey, with its recent influx of refugees from Syria.

Table 3. Non-EU Countries of the Prague Process: Net-migration Rate (per thousand, 1985/1980-2095/2100)

	1985-1990	1995-2000	2015-2020	2025-2030	2045-2050	2095-2100
	-3.9	-14.2	-1.7	-1.7	-1.8	-2.4
Azerbaijan	-4.7	-2.8	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Georgia	-1.6	-28.0	-2.5	-2.6	-2.8	-3.9
Albania	0.0	-11.5	-4.9	-3.9	-3.2	-6.9
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-6.1	-8.4	-6.4	-0.2	-0.2	-0.3



	1985-1990	1995-2000	2015-2020	2025-2030	2045-2050	2095-2100
Montenegro	-9.8	-7.0	-0.8	-0.8	-0.8	-1.0
North Macedonia	-9.9	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-0.8
Serbia	-10.2	-5.9	0.5	-1.2	-1.4	-2.3
[Kosovo]						
Kazakhstan	-8.4	-16.4	-1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Kyrgyzstan	-6.1	-1.2	-0.6	-1.4	-1.1	-0.9
Tajikistan	-1.3	-7.9	-2.2	-1.8	-1.3	-0.8
Turkmenistan	-2.3	-3.0	-0.9	-0.6	-0.5	-0.5
Uzbekistan	-3.7	-2.0	-0.3	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2
Belarus	-0.5	1.1	0.9	0.3	0.3	0.4
Republic of Moldova	-3.9	-7.7	-0.3	-0.4	-0.4	-0.7
Russia	1.2	3.2	1.3	0.7	0.7	0.8
Ukraine	0.0	-1.9	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0
Turkey	-0.4	-0.3	3.5	-2.4	-0.6	-0.7

Source: [United Nations World Populations Prospects, Volume II, New York](#)

Across the PP region, however, emigration rather than immigration has come to dominate in most countries. Only for **Russia** do United Nations projections to the end of the century envisage a net positive flow, drawing migrants in from other PP countries, particularly from Central Asia but also other parts of the former Soviet Union. Ukraine and Belarus are seen to have an overall balance between emigration and immigration but all the other countries, including Turkey after its refugee influx, are projected to have net negative flows (Table 3). **Hence, the majority of PP countries are being hit by a demographic “double whammy”: sustained declining fertility and a continuing emigration.**

Internal migration: the impact of urbanization within the PP countries

The impact of international outflows of population has to be considered against the movements of population within the countries of the PP themselves. All countries will see an increasing concentration of populations in urban areas within their own borders (Table 5). By 2050, only one country, Tajikistan, is projected to have less than half its population living in urban areas. The majority will have more than two thirds of their populations living in towns and cities, with Russia, Belarus and Turkey having four out of every five residents in urban areas. With the exception of the Central Asian countries, all the rest of the PP will see declines in the absolute size of their rural populations, not just a shift in the relative balance between urban and rural. The sustained exodus of these members has a profound impact not so much at the national level but at the local level, particularly in the villages of origin of the migration to towns and cities. The population structures of villages become skewed to older people as they lose their productive and reproductive capabilities that ultimately give rise to rural depopulation. The migration to towns and cities is unlikely to reverse and rural depopulation will become an increasing challenge. The provision of basic services to isolated and ageing rural populations is not only expensive but presents difficulties to source staff to provide health and other support services for rural outposts.

Table 5. Non-EU countries of Prague Process: Proportion of Population in Urban Areas, 2020-2050 (per cent) and Growth in Urban and Rural Populations in 2020

	Proportion urban in 2020	Proportion urban in 2050	Growth in urban population in 2020 (per annum)	Growth in rural population in 2020 (per annum)
Armenia	63.3	74.3	0.23	-1.44
Azerbaijan	56.4	71.0	1.38	-1.03
Georgia	59.5	73.2	0.35	-1.81

With the exception of the Central Asian countries, all the rest of the PP will see declines in the absolute size of their rural populations.

	Proportion urban in 2020	Proportion urban in 2050	Growth in urban population in 2020 (per annum)	Growth in rural population in 2020 (per annum)
Albania	62.1	78.2	1.29	-2.12
Bosnia and Herzegovina	49.0	64.6	0.61	-1.58
Montenegro	67.5	77.3	0.45	-1.37
North Macedonia	58.5	72.8	0.04	-1.72
Serbia	56.4	68.8	0.61	-1.54
[Kosovo]	54.7			
Kazakhstan	57.7	69.1	1.19	0.42
Kyrgyzstan	36.9	53.6	2.05	0.60
Tajikistan	27.5	43.0	2.73	1.42
Turkmenistan	52.5	68.9	2.23	0.18
Uzbekistan	50.4	61.5	1.25	0.98
Belarus	79.5	88.30	0.28	-2.29
Republic of Moldova	42.8	56.9	0.09	-1.51
Russia	74.8	83.3	0.11	-1.75
Ukraine	69.6	78.6	-0,27	-1.73
Turkey	76.1	86.0	1.11	-1.22

Source: United Nations World Urbanization Prospects, the 2018 Revision, New York, at: [World Urbanization Prospects - Population Division - United Nations](#)

Relatively few generalizations can be made about migration although two appear to have stood the test of time. First, the majority of people move relatively short distances and, second, that the majority of those who move are young adults. This does not mean to say that some do not move long distances. They do, as the extension of PP diaspora populations to North America over recent years demonstrates, although these remain a minority. Neither can we say that older people do not move: they do, as the movement of grandparents to look after children in destinations that allow both parents to work, for example, shows. However, again these are the minority of those who move while the majority of migrants fall into both the productive and the reproductive ages of any population.

Future development of labour force growth

The flows of migration from PP countries can be grouped into three general categories: first, intra-cluster exchanges of population, often within the complex mosaic of ethnic groups within each cluster that involve short-distance transfers across borders of families and women for marriage; second, movements to Russia, applies particularly to the Central Asian countries; and third, more recent movements to the European Union, most specifically from the Balkans to Germany, Italy and Bulgaria, Ukraine to Poland, parts of Moldova to Romania and Georgia to Greece. The countries of the PP have emerged as a source of labour to EU countries that are themselves in a more advanced phase of demographic decline. The labour force of Germany as defined by the population 25 to 64 years old, is projected to decline by some 3.5 million between 2020 and 2030 and by another four million to 2050. That of Italy will decline by some 2.5 million between 2020 and 2030 and by almost a further six million to 2050, while the labour force of Greece will decline by 1.5 million to 2050. With the labour force of Russia projected to decline by 10 million just between 2020 and 2030 and more than a further 5 million to 2050, emigration from the PP countries can but continue.

The countries of the PP have emerged as a source of labour to EU countries that are themselves in a more advanced phase of demographic decline.



Table 4. Non-EU countries of Prague Process: Labour Force, Population 25–64 years, 1990–2100 (in thousands)

	1990	2000	2020	2030	2050	2100
Armenia	1,714	1,443	1,649	1,525	1,461	911
Azerbaijan	3,172	3,667	5,715	5,761	5,989	4,389
Georgia	2,735	2,207	2,123	1,900	1,720	1,133
Albania	1,403	1,430	1,531	1,454	1,286	384
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2,332	2,007	1,835	1,665	1,331	710
Montenegro	306	316	335	323	295	203
North Macedonia	988	1,038	1,190	1,141	955	557
Serbia	4,933	4,896	4,687	4,436	3,590	1,830
[Kosovo]						
Kazakhstan	7,534	7,110	9,604	9,586	11,877	13,541
Kyrgyzstan	1,724	1,942	3,071	3,402	4,538	5,433
Tajikistan	1,775	2,101	4,035	4,846	7,371	12,666
Turkmenistan	1,333	1,779	2,940	3,269	4,104	4,295
Uzbekistan	7,381	9,458	16,909	18,943	22,918	21,078
Belarus	5,342	5,208	5,479	4,765	4,303	3,461
Republic of Moldova	2,152	2,064	2,446	2,242	1,846	938
Russia	78,947	78,456	82,808	72,712	66,915	59,623
Ukraine	27,391	26,354	25,202	22,175	17,871	11,509
Turkey	21,596	27,642	42,980	46,520	48,944	37,615

Source: United Nations World Populations Prospects, Volume II, New York, Kosovo Census 2011

The combination of fertility decline and net migration make their more combined immediate impact on the labour force rather than total population growth. Excluding EU member states, the majority of countries in the PP will see their labour forces contract from 2020 (Table 4). Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Russia all fall into this category. The labour forces of a few countries, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey and Uzbekistan, will not decline until after 2050. Those of a few others, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, are not envisaged to decline this century. Some others, Georgia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Ukraine have already seen their labour forces declining since at least 1990. **The contraction of the most productive and reproductive element in the populations in the PP countries is already a policy issue, either from the demand or the supply side of the equation.** Before policy options are considered, it is important to realize that viewing the populations of PP countries as a whole is deceptive and that significant redistribution of those populations has also been occurring over recent years.

POLICY RESPONSES

The decline of population across most of the PP countries in the first half of this century seems to be part of a universal trend and perhaps a “good” thing given the critical issue of global climate change. The impact of the current population on the environment has been considered to be unsustainable and any decline might be viewed positively. However, environmental impact cannot be measured simply in terms of numbers: patterns of consumption are more indicative. Nevertheless, numbers cannot go on increasing forever but the challenges posed by declining populations will be as great as those associated with expanding populations in the previous century and will require sensitive policy intervention. Four main areas of policy intervention can be identified for discussion:

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- Policies to increase fertility.
- Policies to redefine the labour force.
- Policies to substitute physical capital for human capital: automation.
- Policies to import labour and people.

Can fertility be increased?

It is unlikely that the overall direction of fertility decline can be reversed through the introduction of baby bonuses or the provision of subsidized childcare, for example. The significance of policies to influence fertility, either downwards or upwards, is highly contested. Policy can influence the desired direction over the short term, but the number of births per woman over the longer term is more a result of economic and social development. Education of women and their participation in the economy beyond the household are perhaps the fundamental drivers of fertility decline and attempts to restrict those activities are seen to be contrary to the basic tenets of development as well as being unethical. As a result, the improved status of women through education, a recognized fundamental pillar of development, will ensure that the number of births per woman continues to decline.

Can bureaucratic solutions mitigate demographic decline?

Given that people are living longer because of mortality decline and that increased education delays the entry into the labour force, it makes sense to extend the accepted age of retirement upwards. That is, instead of retiring at age 60 or 65, workers will be expected to work until they are 70 years of age or older. However, such solutions might apply more to countries at advanced stages of development where services rather than manufacturing or agriculture dominate. Even in these cases, heavy-duty activities such as heavy goods vehicle (HGV) driving, or repetitive activities in manufacturing, it would be unrealistic to expect workers to extend their time in employment compared to those in desk jobs where working from home may be more of an option. Governments are likely to meet considerable resistance from trade unions should any erosion of hard-fought worker rights be involved. A second option is to increase the proportion of women in the labour force. While all attempts to move towards gender equality are to be welcomed, any such increase in women's employment is likely yet further to depress fertility, as discussed above.

Can automation provide the silver bullet?

The substitution of capital for labour through automation and artificial intelligence (AI) can mitigate labour shortages, although the impact will vary depending upon the nature of the economy. Wealthier economies, and those with greater numbers of skilled workers, will benefit more than poorer economies where labour forces are dominated by the less skilled. Technology is both expensive and the product of established institutions of advanced training. Nor can technologies from external sources necessarily be easily adopted or adapted to local circumstance: they will require continuous support and maintenance. Automation is not a simple substitute for labour, but creates labour demands of its own. Moreover, not all activities are easily substitutable by automation: As populations age, for example, the provision of appropriate care and health services, although supported by new technologies, cannot simply be replaced by them.

Will the importation of labour and people provide the solution?

Perhaps the simplest solution is to extend the labour market to countries where the labour force is still expanding, which, as seen above, will still be the case for some PP countries well into the present century. Given that, as countries develop, domestic labour increasingly becomes oriented towards higher-skilled, better-paid jobs, the future demand for labour will be in less-skilled sectors of the economy, which could logically be met through the importation of workers on labour contract within the PP region. However, the migration of labour will imply long-term programmes that can be politically extremely sensitive. The nativist reactions towards immigration and the movement of labour have been driving forces for political change in the EU and in other countries of immigration. Will PP countries experiencing labour deficits be able to avoid such issues? For this reason, the importation of labour as a general strategy may become more limited in practice than in theory.

The migration of labour will imply long-term programmes that can be politically extremely sensitive.



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CONCLUSION

From a policy perspective, it seems likely that a mix of all four strategies outlined above will need to be tried: no "one-size-fits-all" policy exists. That said, it is also unlikely that any single country can address satisfactorily these challenges alone and the key migration and development policies will have to be developed among countries in each of the PP clusters. Regional development strategies will need to be fashioned among complementary PP countries.

It is the specific development challenges and how these are addressed among PP countries that will determine the future directions of population growth and its increasingly important and variable component, migration. The dependence upon oil in countries such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and the geographical position of most PP countries on the edge of major geopolitical powers, bring very specific issues in a world where the use of fossil fuels and air travel will come under increasing pressure as international policies to combat global climate change begin to bite. Hence, tourism, the lifeline for so many marginal economies, may not have a guaranteed future as a development model for PP countries. The immigration of requisite skills to the PP countries may slow in the near future but emigration will continue or increase to metropolitan powers in the EU and beyond, accelerating the demographic decline of some PP states with long-term political implications. Nevertheless, development models followed by countries in the West are under challenge from those being variously followed by countries in the East, specifically by China, and even by Afghanistan's Islamic model. Although these models employ policies that are often considered anathema to rights-based western approaches, they provide alternative visions of development that have global implications and varying consequences for migration. Migration and population redistribution in their various forms will continue to characterize PP countries as integral parts of their changing future economic, social and political development.

NOTES

1. The classic expression of this age was the book by Ehrlich, P. R. (1968), *The Population Bomb*, Sierra Ballantine Book, although see also Meadows, D. H. et al, (1972), *The Limits to Growth*, London, Pan Books.
2. S. E. Vollset et al. Fertility, mortality, migration, and population scenarios for 195 countries and territories from 2017 to 2100: a forecasting analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study, *The Lancet*, 14 July 2020, at: [Fertility, mortality, migration, and population scenarios for 195 countries and territories from 2017 to 2100: a forecasting analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study - The Lancet](https://www.thelancet.com/journal/S0140673620302521). The specific population, fertility and migration data used in this brief come from the 2019 revision of the United Nations World Populations Prospects, Volume II, New York, at: https://population.un.org/wpp/Publications/Files/WPP2019_Volume-II-Demographic-Profiles.pdf. Data on specific state-to-state flows come from the United Nations International Migrant Stock data base, at: [International Migrant Stock | Population Division \(un.org\)](https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/stock/). Note that data for Kosovo are not available from UN sources. They are available from Eurostat, at Eurostat - [Data Explorer \(europa.eu\)](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/).
3. Figures for Europe and countries in Europe are from the United Nations projections at: https://population.un.org/wpp/Publications/Files/WPP2019_Volume-II-Demographic-Profiles.pdf.
4. United Nations (2001), *Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining Populations?* Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York, ST/ESA/SER.A/206.
5. EU Population in 2020; More Deaths than Births, Eurostat Newsrelease, 111, 2020, at: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/11081093/3-10072020-AP-EN.pdf/d2f799bf-4412-05cc-a357-7b49b93615f1>.
6. See also, V. Rietig and A. Müller, *The New Reality: Germany Adapts to Its Role as a Major Migrant Magnet*, Migration Policy Institute, Washington, 2020, at: [migrationpolicy.org](https://www.migrationpolicy.org/).